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ABSTRACT 
Organizational economics tends to express a pessimistic view on the effectiveness of inter-firm contracts 
under uncertainty, and sees the use of authority and of relational governance as possible remedies. 
Organization theory inspires some skepticism on the effectiveness of these therapies. In particular, it 
identifies also reasons to expect a sustained level of formalization in strategic alliances and, conversely, to 
expect a moderate use of centralization. To help filling this gap, this study empirically assesses the 
relationship between uncertainty and complexity in the context of strategic alliances, and the use of 
formalization and centralization for their governance. The assessment extends to the intensity of use and the 
relationships of three modes of governance: contractual, formal extra-contractual, and informal and social. 
This exercise is carried out on a new database that collects information on 540 project-based alliances. We 
find that inter-organizational projects employ a mix of contractual and extra-contractual governance 
mechanisms. Different from usual conceptualization, these agreements are not characterized by high 
informality. Extra contractual governance seems to be employed to respond to additional factors, rather than 
to substitute or complement formal agreements. Finally, the pattern of allocation of property rights also 
interestingly deviates from standard property right theory predictions, to conform to a more pluralist, 
negotiation based view. 
 
1. Organizational and economic views of contracts 
Organizational economics has studied the role of contracts in inter-firm relationships extensively, examining 
issues connected to the opportunism and self-interest of the parties involved in the relationship, and usually 
considering contract incompleteness as a problem (e.g. Brousseau and Glachant 2002).  Recent economic 
research on inter-firm contracts has come closer to organizational views by endogeneizing the degree of 
completeness and articulation of contracts; the typical propositions having been that the higher the 
uncertainty, the lower the optimal degree of completeness, articulation and formalization (Bernheim and 
Whinston 1998; Crocker and Reynolds 1993) and that the  higher the competitiveness of the game,  the 
higher the optimal level of formalization and of specification of contingent payoffs (Klein 2000). These 
propositions lead to the conclusion that, contractual governance tends to ‘fail’ altogether under the 
simultaneous presence of  uncertainty (hence of contract incompleteness) and conflict of interests;  and tend 
to be replaced by the ‘command’ of one party, based on property rights holding of that party (Williamson 
1975, 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986). A possible alternative remedy has been typically  identified in the 
complementary or alternative use of  ‘relational contracting’ (Williamson 1979; Macneil 1978; Al 
Najjar1985; Baker et al 2002; Poppo and Zenger 2002)  ‘Relational contracting’ refers mostly to the 
completion of incomplete contingent claim contracting through extra-contractual mechanisms, typically 
conceived as informal, ranging from reciprocity and serial equity, to socialization to industry norm to 
cultural objective alignment . 
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An extension and refinement of these propositions is warranted as it is doubtful that ‘informal and social 
governance’ - either based on calculative, ‘incentive-based’ cooperation or non-calculative ‘rule-based’ 
cooperation – can tell the entire story of governance in highly uncertain and innovative activities. In fact, 
both clear incentives and clear norms and rules are difficult to define in highly uncertain and relatively 
unique ventures, where relevant actions and their payoffs are not known ex-ante; and even less is known 
what appropriate behaviors are (Grandori 2006).  Second, a concentration of property and decision rights is 
also an unsatisfactory response if relevant knowledge at the start is distributed and new knowledge should be 
generated for conducting a project or activity (Demsetz 1999; Grandori, forthcoming). 
This paper refines and extends these ideas, also by means of connecting them to organization theory 
definitions and propositions on formalization (use of written, interpersonally controllable documents, either 
of an enforceable or unenforceable kind). 
In organization studies as well as in organizational economics uncertainty is considered a major source of 
failure of formalization (Burns and Stalker 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). However, this proposition 
typically refers to aleatory, environmental variability. Other components of uncertainty, namely all 
components deriving from ‘complexity’ (system size, differentiation and interdependence of components, 
number of elements to be taken into account and memorized) are known to have a positive relationship with 
formalization and hierarchization (Simon 1969). In addition, setting-up a transparent, legitimate, rational-
legal, organizational justice system is a classic function of formal organization in organization theory (Weber 
1922; Blau and Scott 1962) (a much wider notion than simple safeguarding against opportunisms). This 
general function explain why informal systems are also often unduly centralized (Pugh et al 1969), as high 
informality opens the doors to the regulation of activities by power and force relationship. Organizational 
economics is also beginning to acknowledge a role for fairness as a predictor of contractual arrangements 
(Lafontaine and Masten 2002). Cooperations that are explicitly set up among a few identifiable, empowered 
parties – as in strategic alliances – a sustained level of formalization is therefore to be expected. 
As to centralization, the information processing-based organization theory we are referring to, would predict 
that system complexity should be positively related to the formation of hierarchy for coordination reasons 
(Simon 1969; Galbraith 1974) and that task uncertainty is negatively related to centralization because it 
typically connects to distributed knowledge resources (Grandori 2007). 
In sum countervailing forces are likely to act on the optimal level of formalization and centralization of 
governance in uncertain, multi-party (hence multiple interests) alliances. 
The study presented here empirically assesses the relationship between these variables and the intensity of 
use of three modes of governance: contractual governance, formal extra-contractual governance, and 
informal and social governance. In doing so it also enquires on the relations of complementarity, 
substitutability and supplementarity among them. 
The study is guided by some conjectures on possible mixes of the three modes, exploiting the possibility of 
differential use of them on different matters, rather than by the idea of assessing which mode is better under 
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which circumstances, or even on the general intensity of each aggregate mode. In fact, Grandori (2001, 
2005) hypothesized, and recent case study research corroborates (Grandori and Furlotti 2006) that ‘flexible 
formalization’ is achievable by formalizing procedural and constitutional matters rather than tasks and 
contingencies in the face of uncertainty. In particular, contractual formalization that establishes a ‘society’ 
rather than regulating an exchange can provide incentives to invest and at the same time allow adaptation, by 
specifying the identity of partners and the fundamental obligations and rights as to resource commitment, 
outcomes appropriation and the termination of the relationship; and the fundamental rules and procedures for 
taking decisions. An association of resources and a constitution specifying decision procedures should avoid 
the rigidity and costs (or even the impossibility) of writing articulated contracts on all possible actions and 
contingencies, while locking in resources, that are essential to the achievement of the objectives of the 
collaboration. 
In this perspective, the major way for achieving flexibility is not to shift from contractual to extra-contractual 
or informal governance, but to shift from the specification of actions and contingencies (tasks) to the 
specification of residual rewards and decision rights over actions. Hence, we do not expect tasks to be highly 
specified in any governance mode in highly uncertain projects. 
The specific allocation of association rights and obligations (typically investment commitments and property 
rights, and separation rights), and the content of the constitutional rules may and should vary. On that ground 
too we are going to propose empirical evidence and theoretical arguments that contradict one tenet that has 
been prevailing in property rights theory, namely that property right sharing is never efficient (Hart 1995; 
Hansman 1996). The reason for concentration given in that perspective apparently hinges on the cost of the 
decision process (property right sharing would raise decision and negotiation costs). In turn, this is supposed 
to lower the incentives to invest on the part of critical resource holders. Without denying the possible 
relevance of decision process costs, they have to be traded off with important advantages of assigning 
property rights in proportion to the  investments of both financial and human capital, rather than to the party 
that ‘value them most’. Those advantages include: to provide incentives to co-invest to all partners (Gibbons 
2004), also in the form of  fair payoff  division procedures – as proportionality to investments (Raiffa 1982), 
and to reach better decisions by allocating decision rights to the parties that are more competent, to the 
advantage of those investing critical financial and technical assets too (Demsetz 1999). 
2. Data and measures 
The evidence presented here is drawn from a large data-base (540 questionnaires) on the governance of inter-
firm projects in a variety of industry and nations (the KGP project).1 Questionnaire on inter-firm project-
                                                 
1 KGP is the international research project ‘Knowledge , Governance and Projects: Configurations and Dynamics of the Project-
based Economy’ (2004-2007) coordinated by Anna Grandori, Crora-Bocconi University; partners: Patrick Cohendet (University of 
Strasbourg and Montreal), Mark Ebers (University of Colone), Gernot Grabher (University of Bonn), Peter Maskell (Copenhagen 
Business School), Andrea Prencipe (SPRU - University of Sussex and Università of Pescara); and funded by the Italian Ministry for 
Education, University and Research (MIUR) and by the collaborating universities. The KGP was extended to two new scientific 
partners: the U. of Tilburg (Leon Oerlemans) and the U. of Bologna (A. Lipparini).  
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based alliance contracts provide data on which matters are regulated contractually and extra-contractually in 
inter-firm projects. Each questionnaire describes one project that was ‘successful’ in the sense of having 
been completed and having produced an outcome of value.  
2.1. The sample 
Tables 1 and 2 provide a description of the sample in terms of industries, location and response rate. The 
industries in which to carry out the research (‘high tech’, ‘creative’, and ‘engineering’; henceforth, 
respectively, ‘HT’, ‘C’ and ‘E’) were chosen because they are characterized by projects that are significantly 
different in terms of uncertainty and complexity. Each industry was targeted in at least two countries in order 
to control for institutional settings.  
Interviewees were asked to select a project completed within the last three years, which involved different 
legal entities as partners, in which they or their organization was a key partner and which was successful, in 
the sense of having been economically viable and having produced a valuable output.  
As projects were accessed through any of their main partners, the criteria used to construct the listings of 
firms were not likely to influence the representativeness of the sample. For this reason, we used convenience 
sampling and firms were selected using either national statistical offices or industry listings. Up to three 
projects could be accessed through the same firm. Firms contacted were those operating in each country, 
independently of the location of their headquarters. 
As project level data is typically not available in national or industry statistics and reports, the population of 
projects is unknown. Indirect data on the population was gathered by recording the reason for refusal to 
respond. 
The interviewing process required the interviewers to identify a suitable respondent. As the persons who 
have the best overview of projects have different job titles in different industries, specific roles were targeted 
in specific industries (e.g., account managers in advertisement, CEO/owner in small high-tech firms, project 
managers in engineering and engineering design firms). However, this targeting was used as an initial guide 
only. A cursory overview of the role of respondents in their organization and in the project shows that almost 
all respondents held at least managerial responsibilities.  
Candidate interviewees were contacted by phone. Once they agreed to take part in the survey, the interview 
protocol required the interviewer to help the interviewee to select the project and two key project partners. A 
questionnaire with these data already filled in was to be mailed or e-mailed the interviewee, and returned by 
the same means. Researchers were available to provide clarifications if needed. In practice, the protocol 
differed between samples.2 
                                                 
2 In Denmark, interviewers were able to complete the data collection on the telephone, without sending the questionnaire by e-mail or 
mail. I in Italy, it was not possible to begin to fill in the questionnaire over the phone. Highlights of the instructions section about 
how to choose the project and the partners were repeated in the accompanying e-mail.  
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It was agreed that, when possible, information about age, ownership, sales, number of employees, and 
percentage of export in sales of the respondent firms should be gathered. In addition, information on the 
NACE code corresponding to the project’s activity should be gathered. Different samples differ significantly 
in the extent to which this information could be obtained. 
Each section introduces the variables it analyzes. Table 3 explains how the variables of interest to this study 
have been operationalized. 
3. Statistical analyses 
3.1. General incidence of  governance modes  
Our first analysis investigates the degree of specification of governance mechanisms in formal enforceable 
documents (contractual governance), in non-enforceable internal documents (extra-contractual governance) 
and through the norms, habits and practices of the industry or ad hoc specific informal agreements among the 
parties (institutional and social governance). An exploratory factor analysis indicates that items within each 
mode of specification are quite highly correlated, and that each mode identifies a governance dimension of 
its own. Correlation coefficients and descriptive statistics are illustrated in Table 4.  
Rather than on the intensity of specification within each mode, we focus on the specification across modes. 
Our initial, qualitative considerations are inspired by Figure 1, which summarizes the descriptive statistics 
graphically. First of all, it is apparent from the figure that for each mechanism of governance contractual 
specification is higher than the two alternative ways of extra-contractual specification; and that formalization 
in non contractual documents is more intensively employed that informal and social governance. For several 
items, contractual specification is in the neighborhood of values representing “Extensive specification of 
rights and obligations under conceivable specified conditions”. The pattern supports the general conjecture 
that formal contractual governance is indeed possible and used in complex and uncertain activities.  
Our second observation is that the ranking of items by their degree of extra contractual specification does 
not parallel their ranking in contractual specification. This suggests that there is no clear indication of a 
complementarity relationship between the two ways of formalizing governance mechanisms. At the same 
time, we notice that the ranking of items by their degree of extra contractual specification is not the reverse 
of their ranking in contractual specification, which suggests that there is no clear indication either of a 
substitution relationship between the two ways of formalizing governance mechanisms.  
The previous two comments apply also to the relationship between contractual specification, and institutional 
and social specification. In sum, the type of relationship between the three modes of specification must be 
assessed at the level of the individual mechanism. 
We make such assessment with the help of Table 5, which shows the results of paired sample tests of the 
difference of means between alternative formalizations of the same governance mechanism. As was already 
evident from Figure 1, all the differences are positive and, with two exceptions, they are statistically 
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significant. If large differences can be constructed as indicia of substitution relationship, and small 
differences of complementary relationship, we should tentatively propose  that the extra contractual (formal 
and informal) specification of prices and of warranties and indemnities (expressions of substantive, 
transactional matters) is substitute with their contractual specification; while complementary between  
contractual and extra-contractual governance modes is visible in the case of decision and control rights 
(expressions of  procedural constitutional matters). 
The orders of the differences in Panels 1 and 2 of Table 5 (and the size of differences relating to the same 
mechanism) are roughly the same. It is implicit in the previous findings that the mechanisms of extra 
contractual and social governance stand among each other in a relationship which is the opposite of the one 
they have with contractual governance. This is exemplified rather strikingly by property rights. 
The differences involving task specification are smallish, and not very large, in each of the three types of 
comparison. In absolute terms, the contractual specification of tasks has an intermediate level of 1.81. This 
confirms the hypothesis that on this subject, neither internal documents nor social governance can specify 
more effectively what cannot be done in contracts. 
3.2. Uncertainty and complexity effects  
We turn now to the potential predictors of the use of different governance mechanisms. As the focus shifts 
on the predictors, we temporarily summarize each mode of specification through a summated scale of its 
seven items. This simplification is warranted by the relative unidimensionality of each construct.3 As shown 
in Table 6, the correlations between individual items that capture the uncertainty of the project (the last four 
of the table) and governance variables are rather small. Therefore, it is unlikely that even in more 
sophisticated modeling, any single item turns out to be an important predictor of governance aspects. 
Accordingly we focus on the sector as a potential composite measure of complexity and a predictor of 
governance. To investigate whether our conjecture is correct we carry out several analyses of variance using 
the project sector as an explanatory factor.  
To take into account the potential problems of carrying out repeated ANOVA on the same sample (possible 
increase Type I errors; possible reduction in multivariate variance as a result of correlation between the 
dependent variables) we preliminarily analyze our sample with MANOVA. MANOVA should tell us 
whether the explanatory factor has explanatory power at all, in relation to the whole set of dependent 
variables that characterize the projects in terms of size, uncertainty and complexity. Yet, to interpret 
MANOVA’s findings we still need follow-up univariate ANOVAs that focus on the effects of the 
independent variable (henceforth: IV) for each dependent variable (henceforth: DV). Finally, post-hoc 
comparisons, to detect which pairs of groups differ from one another, complete our investigations. 
                                                 
3 Cronbach alpha for the first three items of Table 3 is, respectively, 0.81, 0.89 and 0.89. 
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A logarithmic transformation has been applied to some variables, to reduce skewness and to better meet the 
assumptions of multivariate normality required by MANOVA. Despite the transformations all variables still 
fail the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality. However, visual inspection and kurtosis values reveal that none of 
the variables is platykurtic. Therefore we can expect no serious reduction of the power of MANOVA. 
Table 7 reports the results of our MANOVA and of subsequent analyses. A significant value of for all the 
four statistics employed (Panel A) tells us that a linear combination of the DVs do varies as a function of the 
project type.4 
The results shown in Panel B indicate that with the exception of the differentiation of requisite competences, 
for all the DVs the means of each group are statistically different at the 0.01 level of significance: indeed 
different types of projects are characterized by systematic differences in task characteristics, size, duration 
and uncertainty. Next, we carry out pair-wise comparisons to investigate which pairs of groups differ from 
one another. The group representative of highest uncertainty is presumably HT projects. Therefore we are 
interested in the differences between this type of projects on one side, and E and C project on the other. The 
results of this investigation are displayed in Panel C.5 One empirical regularity uncovered by this analysis is 
that HT and E projects differ systematically on a much larger number of characteristics than HT and C 
projects. As indicated by negative differences, HT project are smaller than E projects on all measures of size, 
and last for significantly shorter periods (E projects are more complex, also in terms of the number and 
differentiation of tasks). HT projects are also are associated with higher levels of uncertainty than E projects, 
at least when this is measured by the percentage of activities that required revision, by the percentage of 
innovative activities employed and by the percentage of activities of the whole project for which it was 
necessary to exchange knowledge. As to the comparison between HT and C projects, the former have larger 
budgets and require longer times to completion and to reveal whether the project was successful or not, and 
involve a larger percentage of innovative activities. However, they do not require a more intensive exchange 
of knowledge among the partners, nor they have a greater percentage of activities which it is necessary to 
revise during the course of the project. 
The comparison between C and E projects does not tell a very different story from the comparison between 
the latter and HT ones. C projects are smaller, employ more innovative activities and require a greater 
exchange of knowledge among the parties. However, unlike HT projects, creative projects obtain indications 
of success significantly quicker than E ones. 
In sum, E, C and HT projects can be considered as representative of increasing and qualitatively different 
levels of uncertainty. E projects can be considered as representative of situations of uncertainty largely due to 
‘computational complexity’: very high number of components and connections to be regulated. HT and C 
projects are subject to stronger uncertainty, intended as problem solving and discovery intensity, as new 
knowledge has to be generated and exchanged for conducting them.  
                                                 
4 The statistics employed were Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s trace, Pillai’ trace and Roy’s gcr.  
5 These comparison applied Tamhane T2 statistics, a conservative pairwise comparisons test based on the t test, which does not 
assume that the populations have the same variance. 
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Having established that the industry sector is a meaningful composite measure of the complexity of the 
project, we investigate whether it also a useful predictor of its governance. Once more, the investigation is 
carried out by MANOVA and follow-up analyses. The dependent variables are the three groups of seven 
items of each governance specification mode. 
Contractual formalization – With regards to this mode, the multivariate analysis indicates that a linear 
combination of these items differs significantly among project types (Table 8). Subsequent univariate 
analyses indicate that almost all items, except the specification of separation procedures, and the 
specification of monetary rewards, contribute to the difference. However, the post hoc comparison of group 
means reveals that three of these items differ significantly between HT and E projects, three again between C 
and E projects, and one between HT and C. In particular, in comparison with E projects, HT (and C) projects 
specify less in detail the duration of the project and the tasks to be performed, but HT projects specify more 
clearly the assignments of property rights. As to the comparison between HT and C projects, the only 
significant difference is that decision rights are more specified in the latter. Finally, C projects appear lighter 
than E ones in bureaucratic governance, as they specify less in detail warrantees and indemnities. 
Extra-contractual formalization – Multivariate analysis shows that, as a whole, extra-contractual 
formalization differ across project types (Table 9). The pattern is analogous to that observed for contractual 
formalization. Most items are responsible for the observed difference, with the exception of the specification 
of decision rights and of separation procedures, on which informal governance plays a greater role in all 
cases. As to group comparison, post-hoc tests reveal a significant difference between HT and E projects for 
three items: duration, warranties and monetary terms. In all cases specification is lower in HT projects 
(which, therefore, are more open-ended and include less market-like mechanisms as well as less bureaucratic 
mechanisms). For most items C projects are approximately in the same relationships with E ones as HT 
projects. However, C projects specify tasks significantly less. Finally, HT and C projects differ in their 
formal extra-contractual specification of property rights and decision rights, as well as of tasks, with both of 
them being more specified in HT projects. 
Informal governance – With regards to the extent to which various rights and duties are informally regulated 
by the norms, habits and practices of the industry or by ad hoc specific informal agreements among the 
parties, the general pattern is that the core matters of the analyzed agreements are regulated by self-
enforceable informal agreements or by socially enforceable norms only to a limited extent. Given that, the 
systematic difference across projects types in this regard are also not very important and significant (Table 
10).6 
3.3. Assignments of property rights 
                                                 
6 Just one item seems to be responsible for this difference: HT projects use informal definition of decision and control rights more 
than other projects 
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Our final set of analyses addresses the measures of the inequality of assignment of various property rights 
among the actors of the project. Property rights assignments within a project have been originally measured 
by asking the respondent what was, in percentage terms, the participation of each project partner to the 
governance of the project. To assess the degree of inequality of these assignments, we resorted to the Gini 
coefficient. This measure of statistical dispersion has several desirable properties. In particular, the fact of 
being population invariant allows us to use it for comparing the dispersion of rights assignments in projects 
with different numbers of participants.  
The practical implementation of this strategy had to overcome one difficulty. Each project, as we said, has a 
variable number n of partners. For each project we observe the percentage of decision rights assigned to the 
key partners. In general the number of key partners (k) is equal or smaller than n. The decision rights 
assigned to the key partners need not sum up to 100%, as other partners may hold some rights. However 
across all partners, decision rights must sum up to 100%. We needed to calculate the Gini coefficient G of 
the distribution of rights in each project in a way that takes into account the fact that in general we do not 
observe the exact right assignments of the partners from k+1th to nth.. The strategy that we followed was to 
make alternative assumptions on the distribution of rights among the unobserved project partners, and 
calculate the corresponding G. We assumed two extreme distributions: a) all the rights not assigned to the 
three key partners are evenly distributed among the remaining partners; b) just one actor holds all the rights 
not assigned to the three key partners. We then calculated one value of G in correspondence of each 
hypothesis, and the average of the two values thus obtained. All the analyses in this paper employ the 
average G. This is justified for three reasons. First, for most projects, the percentage of rights held by the key 
partners is in the neighborhood of 90%. Second, the range between the extreme values of G is rather small, 
on average around 0.01-0.02, versus mean values of G between 0.74 and 0.88.7 Third, the results of our 
analyses are not seriously impacted on by the choice of one G or another. 
Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics and the correlations for the Gini indexes of five categories of rights. 
As we said, the means of the indexes range from 0.74 to 0.88, versus theoretical extreme values of 0 and 1, 
representing, respectively, perfectly uniform and perfectly concentrated distributions. A lower value of the 
number of observations N indicates that the item on property rights on assets was not applicable to a 
considerable number of projects. Correlations are substantial, yet far from perfect for every pair of 
coefficients. 
To assess the extent to which the degree of inequality differs across different rights, we conducted paired 
sample tests of difference of means. Table 12 reports the tests results. In the leftmost ‘Pairs’ column, the 
items are listed in decreasing ordered of the Gini index. As higher values of the Gini index indicate more 
unequal distributions, the results in the Table inform us that in project governance assignments of output 
ownership and control rights (in that order) are significantly more concentrated than assignments of other 
rights. Moreover, rights on monetary results are significantly more unequal than assignments of asset 
                                                 
7 Data available from the authors. 
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ownership. Although an imperfect correlation between various types of rights has been observed also by 
Kaplan and Stroemberg (2003), a partial misalignment between cash flow rights and asset ownership is not 
in line with common wisdom. 
As we did with the degree of specification of governance mechanisms, we assessed also whether project 
complexity and uncertainty, as proxied by the industry sector, associate with different degrees of inequality 
of rights assignments. Table 13 indicates that the concentration of decision rights, control rights and rights on 
monetary results differ significantly across industry sectors, while that of asset and output ownership does 
not. In particular, C projects exhibit greater concentration of the three significant rights than HT projects, and 
greater concentration of rights on monetary results than E ones. By contrast, no appreciable difference can be 
detected between E and HT projects.8 
4. Conclusions 
Empirical evidence shows that inter-organizational projects employ a mix of contractual and extra-
contractual governance mechanisms. Coherently with our framework, and differently from usual 
conceptualization, these agreements are not characterized by high ‘relational intensity’ in the sense of high 
informality, nor by a ‘mix’ or juxtaposition between informal relational governance and transactional, task 
specific formal contracts. Formal contracts are not highly ‘incomplete’ contracts either. They are 
associational and constitutional contracts, quite complete on fundamental rights. These contracts are flexible 
not because they are informal but because they are associational and constitutional. Actually, this pattern 
holds also for extra-contractual governance. Hence, in designing governance arrangements, a main 
distinction runs between the levels of regulation (general versus detailed, procedural versus substantive) 
rather than between formal and informal and contractual versus extra-contractual. 
Some further principles ‘add on’ this general guideline, i.e. further regulatory mechanisms can be added 
(rather than substituted) in order to respond to other factors. They can therefore be conceived as 
‘supplements’ (rather than either substitutes or complements). For example, the degree of formal articulation 
in task description has to be high in case of high complexity (large number of matters and partners) of the 
action system; while the degree of formal procedural regulation can be lower, in general because it is a more 
cooperative issue, and in particular in those cases where a rich set of customs and habits are available. Hence 
the results of the study confirms that the relations of complementarity, substitutability and supplementarity 
have to be assessed at the level of single mechanisms, and not at the level of aggregate modes of governance 
(e.g. contractual versus extra-contractual). 
                                                 
8 These analyses have been carried out on a subsample that excluded the four largest projects with budget ≥ 1 bln EUR and the 
Canadian projects. Unlike the previous analyses, these cases seem to have a disproportionate impact of the results. This is quite 
understandable for the largest projects. Large budgets also associate with large number of partners. Therefore the limits of our 
measure of the Gini index (which relies on information on the key partners only) become more apparent. The impact of Canadian 
projects on the results is less clearly understandable. A more uncertain industry affiliation than for other countries, due to greater 
difficulty to establish the NACE code of the project may be responsible for the influence. 
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The pattern  of allocation of property rights also interestingly deviates from standard property right theory 
predictions, to conform to a more pluralist, negotiation based view, as rights are shared, at least to some 
extent, and different rights are allocated to different partners. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Overview of the sample 
Location Firms 
contacted 
 
Projects Response 
Rate 
Germany (Bonn) 760 100 13,2% 
Denmark 463 101 21,8% 
Italy 584 93 15,9% 
Germany (Cologne) 462 128 27,7% 
Silicon Valley 155 50 32,3% 
Sophia Antipolis 114 18 15,8% 
Montreal 500 50 10,0% 
Total sample 3.038 540 17,8% 
 
 
Table 2: Projects per industry and country  
  Germany Denmark Italy Montreal 
Sophia 
Antipolis 
Silicon 
Valley   
 Creative 
Industry 
 
73 47 1 3 0 0 124 
  Engineering 
Industry 
 
134 21 86 3 2 0 246 
  High Tech 
Industry 
 
22 32 6 44 16 50 170 
Total 229 100 93 50 18 50 540 
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Table 3: Operationalization of variables 
 Variable Operationalization 
Degrees of contractual specification Q.: “How were the following matters regulated in written, legal, 
enforceable contracts between the three key partners?” 
0 = "Not specified in contracts" 
1= "General principles specified" 
2 = "Extensive specification of rights and obligations under conceivable 
specified conditions" 
3 = "Complete specification of rights and obligations so that they hold 
under any condition" 
1 DCS property rights 
2 DCS decision and control rights 
3 DCS tasks 
4 DCS duration 
5 DCS separation procedures 
6 DCS warrantees and indemnities 
7 DCS prices, fees and royalties 
Degrees of contractual specification Q.: “To what extent were the following matters regulated by written internal charts, procedures and job descriptions (e.g. of the type used in 
internal organization) in the relation between the three key partners?” 
0 = "Not specified in contracts" 
1= "General principles specified" 
2 = "Extensive specification of rights and obligations under conceivable 
specified conditions" 
3 = "Complete specification of rights and obligations so that they hold 
under any condition" 
8 ECS property rights 
9 ECS decision and control rights 
10 ECS tasks 
11 ECS duration 
12 ECS separation procedures 
13 ECS warranties and indemnities 
14 ECS prices, fees and royalties 
Degrees of social and institutional specification 
15 ISS property rights Q.: “To what extent were the following matters regulated by the norms, 
habits and practices of the industry or by ad hoc specific informal 
agreements among the parties in your project, rather than being written 
into a contract or into internal documents, in the relation between the three 
key partners?” 
0 = "Not specified in contracts" 
1= "General principles specified" 
2 = "Extensive specification of rights and obligations under conceivable 
specified conditions" 
3 = "Complete specification of rights and obligations so that they hold 
under any condition" 
16 ISS decision and control rights 
17 ISS tasks 
18 ISS duration 
19 ISS separation procedures 
20 ISS warranties and indemnities 
21 ISS prices fees and royalties 
Project complexity and knowledge intensity 
22 Contractual formalization Sum of items 1-7 
23 Extra contractual formalization Sum of items 8-14 
24 Relational governance Sum of items 15-21 
25 Log10 Project size: persons Log10 total # of persons in project 
26 Log10 Project size: partners 
Log 10 total # of independent entities – either physical or legal persons – 
providing distinguishable input 
27 Log10 Project size: budget Log 10 of project budget in Euros 
28 Log10 Project duration (weeks)  
29 
Differentiation of requisite 
competences 
100 - the largest share of the full range of activities that a single person 
would have been fully qualified to carry out (irrespective of acceptable 
work-load) 
30 Log10 Coincident feedback (weeks) 
Log 10 # weeks after which indicators of success were available, during 
the life of the project 
31 Log10 Lagged feedback (weeks) 
Log 10 # weeks after which indicators of success were available, after 
project completion 
32 % revised activities 
% of activities of the whole project for which it was necessary to revise 
when, how or which activities should be carried out 
33 % innovative activities 
% of activities of the whole project for which it was necessary to generate 
new knowledge (e.g., new approaches, new analytic schemes) 
Inequality of property rights assignments 
34 Gini of asset ownership 
(Gini index of inequality of ) participation (in % terms) of each project 
partner to the governance of the project 
35 Gini of output ownership Same as above 
36 Gini of monetary results Same as above 
37 Gini of decision rights Same as above 
38 Gini of control rights Same as above 
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 Table 4 – Project governance: descriptive statistics and correlations 
PANEL A: Contractual formalization 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 DCS property rights 1       
2 DCS decision and control rights 0.440 1      
3 DCS tasks 0.216 0.363 1     
4 DCS duration 0.191 0.289 0.534 1    
5 DCS separation procedures 0.393 0.458 0.367 0.400 1   
6 DCS warrantees and indemnities 0.367 0.384 0.380 0.427 0.620 1  
7 DCS prices, fees and royalties 0.287 0.321 0.375 0.474 0.362 0.458 1 
         
 Mean 1.71 1.42 1.81 1.97 1.53 1.87 2.22 
 Std. Deviation 1.18 1.10 0.98 0.97 1.15 1.08 0.89 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Maximum 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
  N 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
Note: DCS: “Degree of contractual specification”. 
 
PANEL B: Extra contractual formalization 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 ECS property rights 1       
2 ECS decision and control rights 0.580 1      
3 ECS tasks 0.350 0.487 1     
4 ECS duration 0.423 0.438 0.676 1    
5 ECS separation procedures 0.517 0.512 0.466 0.508 1   
6 ECS warranties and indemnities 0.491 0.490 0.533 0.640 0.629 1  
7 ECS prices, fees and royalties 0.462 0.439 0.547 0.670 0.563 0.738 1 
         
 Mean 0.91 1.07 1.52 1.51 0.98 1.17 1.48 
 Std. Deviation 1.13 1.08 1.05 1.14 1.14 1.20 1.24 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Maximum 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
  N 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
Note: ECS: “Extra-contractual specification”. 
         
PANEL C: Informal governance 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 ISS property rights 1       
2 ISS decision and control rights 0.516 1      
3 ISS tasks 0.429 0.570 1     
4 ISS duration 0.483 0.414 0.624 1    
5 ISS separation procedures 0.594 0.458 0.459 0.563 1   
6 ISS warranties and indemnities 0.536 0.388 0.519 0.625 0.684 1  
7 ISS prices fees and royalties 0.536 0.427 0.562 0.670 0.612 0.722 1 
         
 Mean 0.85 1.01 1.22 0.91 0.80 0.89 0.93 
 Std. Deviation 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.11 1.05 1.09 1.12 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Maximum 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 N 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
Note: ISS = “Informal and social specification” 
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Figure 1 – Governance mechanisms: mean degrees of specification 
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Table 5 – Paired sample tests of difference of means between alternative formalizations of the same 
governance mechanism 
   Paired Differences     
  95% C-I of the Difference   
  Mean Lower Upper t (df 539) 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Panel 1: DCS minus ECS      
Property rights 0.80 0.68 0.91 13.51 0.000 
Prices, fees and royalties 0.74 0.63 0.85 13.04 0.000 
Warranties and indemnities 0.70 0.59 0.81 12.42 0.000 
Separation procedures 0.55 0.44 0.65 9.97 0.000 
Duration 0.46 0.36 0.56 8.73 0.000 
Decision and control rights 0.35 0.24 0.46 6.45 0.000 
Tasks 0.29 0.19 0.40 5.41 0.000 
      
Panel 2: DCS minus ISS      
Prices, fees and royalties 1.29 1.18 1.41 21.63 0.000 
Duration 1.06 0.94 1.18 17.11 0.000 
Warranties and indemnities 0.98 0.86 1.1 15.69 0.000 
Property rights 0.86 0.73 0.99 12.90 0.000 
Separation procedures 0.73 0.6 0.85 11.44 0.000 
Tasks 0.60 0.47 0.72 9.31 0.000 
Decision and control rights 0.41 0.28 0.54 6.12 0.000 
      
Panel 3: ECS minus ISS      
Duration 0.60 0.48 0.72 9.88 0.000 
Prices, fees and royalties 0.55 0.43 0.67 8.99 0.000 
Tasks 0.31 0.19 0.42 5.07 0.000 
Warranties and indemnities 0.28 0.16 0.40 4.70 0.000 
Separation procedures 0.18 0.07 0.29 3.21 0.001 
Property rights 0.06 -0.06 0.18 1.04 0.299 
Decision and control rights 0.05 -0.07 0.18 0.87 0.385 
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Table 6– Summated scales of project governance and project features: correlations and descriptive statistics 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Contractual formalization 1            
Extra contractual formalization 0.362 1           
Relational governance 0.008 0.237 1          
Log10 Project size: persons 0.306 0.092 -0.147 1         
Log10 Project size: partners 0.185 -0.011 -0.056 0.557 1        
Log10 Project size: budget 0.310 0.200 -0.167 0.677 0.394 1       
Log10 Project duration (weeks) 0.160 0.118 -0.081 0.422 0.221 0.525 1      
Differentiation of requisite 
competences 0.188 0.092 -0.049 0.319 0.197 0.334 0.203 1     
Log10 Coincident feedback 
(weeks) 0.043 0.016 -0.051 0.133 0.007 0.262 0.418 0.075 1    
Log10 Lagged feedback (weeks) 0.022 0.033 0.073 -0.050 0.009 0.040 0.184 0.027 0.265 1   
% revised activities 0.011 -0.048 -0.073 0.040 0.048 0.079 0.109 -0.053 0.097 -0.019 1  
% innovative activities 0.002 -0.068 -0.044 -0.065 -0.014 -0.096 0.052 0.035 0.050 -0.009 0.327 1 
             
Mean 12.53 8.65 6.61 1.42 0.72 5.98 1.64 68.10 0.98 0.85 28.57 25.92 
Std. Deviation 5.07 6.18 5.88 0.61 0.37 1.25 0.52 25.13 0.55 0.61 24.75 23.11 
Minimum 0 0 0 0.00 0.30 2.70 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 21 21 21 4.54 2.88 10.56 3.62 100 2.32 2.49 100 100 
N 540 540 540 539 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 
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Table 7 – Project features: Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
PANEL A: Factor 
   Value Label N 
Project class 1 Engineering 239 
 2 Creative 103 
 3 High-Tech 132 
  Total 474 
 
PANEL B: Multivariate Tests    
Multivariate Test Value F   
Pillai's Trace *** 0.463 11.571 p < 0.01 
Wilks' Lambda ** 0.580 11.986 p < 0.01 
Hotelling's Trace *** 0.648 12.402 p < 0.01 
Roy's Largest Root* 0.499 19.169 p < 0.01 
*: The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance 
level; **: exact; ***: approximate 
    
PANEL C: Univariate ANOVAs    
Dependent Variable F    
Log10 Project size: persons 19.188 p < 0.01  
Log10 Project size: partners 11.130 p < 0.01  
Log10 Project size: budget 57.652 p < 0.01  
Log10 Project duration (weeks) 29.791 p < 0.01  
Differentiation of requisite competences 1.733 n.s.  
Log10 Coincident feedback (weeks) 15.675 p < 0.01  
Log10 Lagged feedback (weeks) 5.398 p < 0.01  
% revised activities 7.129 p < 0.01  
% innovative activities 32.149 p < 0.01  
% kw exchange requirement 24.878 p < 0.01  
 
PANEL D: Post hoc comparison of group means 
 I:  High-Tech; J:  Engineering  I : High-Tech; J: Creative 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Diff.    
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error    
Mean Diff.    
(I-J) Std. Error   
Log10 Project size: persons -0.376 0.065 p < 0.01  -0.090 0.071 n.s. 
Log10 Project size: partners -0.182 0.037 p < 0.01  -0.079 0.037 n.s. 
Log10 Project size: budget -0.875 0.133 p < 0.01  0.453 0.150 p < 0.01 
Log10 Project duration (weeks) -0.225 0.055 p < 0.01  0.204 0.074 p < 0.05 
Differentiation of requisite competences 4.549 2.787 n.s.  5.298 3.382 n.s. 
Log10 Coincident feedback (weeks) 0.021 0.056 n.s.  0.344 0.075 p < 0.01 
Log10 Lagged feedback (weeks) 0.008 0.066 n.s.  0.225 0.080 p < 0.05 
% revised activities 9.888 2.732 p < 0.01  4.188 3.605 n.s. 
% innovative activities 19.013 2.466 p < 0.01  10.228 3.367 p < 0.01 
% kw exchange requirement 19.831 3.208 p < 0.01  1.936 4.035 n.s. 
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(Table 7 – Continued) 
 I:  Creative; J:  Engineering 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Diff.    
(I-J) Std. Error   
Log10 Project size: persons -0.286 0.065 p < 0.01 
Log10 Project size: partners -0.103 0.040 p < 0.05 
Log10 Project size: budget -1.328 0.121 p < 0.01 
Log10 Project duration (weeks) -0.430 0.061 p < 0.01 
Differentiation of requisite competences -0.749 2.961 n.s. 
Log10 Coincident feedback (weeks) -0.324 0.068 p < 0.01 
Log10 Lagged feedback (weeks) -0.217 0.071 p < 0.01 
% revised activities 5.700 3.087 n.s. 
% innovative activities 8.785 2.818 p < 0.01 
% kw exchange requirement 17.895 3.548 p < 0.01 
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Table 8 – Contractual governance: multivariate analysis of variance 
PANEL A        
        
Multivariate Tests        
Factor variable: Project Class        
  Value F       
Pillai's Trace *** 0.164 5.967 p < 0.01     
Wilks' Lambda ** 0.841 6.020 p < 0.01     
Hotelling's Trace *** 0.183 6.073 p < 0.01     
Roy's Largest Root * 0.138 9.198 p < 0.01     
*: The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the 
significance level; **: exact; ***: approximate     
        
PANEL B        
        
Univariate ANOVA's        
Factor variable: Project Class        
Dependent Variable F        
DCS property rights 7.078 p < 0.01      
DCS decision and control rights 3.212 p < 0.05      
DCS tasks 12.165 p < 0.01      
DCS duration 6.087 p < 0.01      
DCS separation procedures 0.929 n.s.      
DCS warrantees and indemnities 4.709 p < 0.01      
DCS prices, fees and royalties 1.799 n.s.      
        
PANEL C        
        
Post hoc comparison of group means       
 I:  High-Tech; J:  Engineering  I : High-Tech; J: Creative 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Diff.   
(I-J) Std. Error    
Mean Diff.   
(I-J) Std. Error   
DCS property rights 0.466 0.121 p < 0.01  0.215 0.147 n.s. 
DCS decision and control rights 0.017 0.114 n.s.  -0.298 0.137 p < 0.1 
DCS tasks -0.363 0.102 p < 0.01  0.136 0.132 n.s. 
DCS duration -0.245 0.102 p < 0.05  0.123 0.135 n.s. 
DCS separation procedures -0.038 0.124 n.s.  0.147 0.152 n.s. 
DCS warrantees and indemnities -0.177 0.115 n.s.  0.204 0.151 n.s. 
DCS prices, fees and royalties -0.173 0.103 n.s.  -0.180 0.121 n.s. 
 
 I:  Creative; J:  Engineering 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Diff.  
(I-J) Std. Error   
DCS property rights 0.251 0.139 n.s. 
DCS decision and control rights 0.316 0.131 n.s. 
DCS tasks -0.499 0.119 p < 0.01 
DCS duration -0.368 0.123 p < 0.01 
DCS separation procedures -0.185 0.138 n.s. 
DCS warrantees and indemnities -0.381 0.135 p < 0.05 
DCS prices, fees and royalties 0.007 0.103 n.s. 
Test statistic: Tamhane    
Use of alternative tests gives similar results 
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Table 9  – Extra-contractual formalization: multivariate analysis of variance 
PANEL A        
        
Multivariate Tests        
Factor variable: Project Class        
Multivariate Test Value F       
Pillai's Trace *** 0.126 4.479 p < 0.01     
Wilks' Lambda ** 0.878 4.481 p < 0.01     
Hotelling's Trace *** 0.135 4.484 p < 0.01     
Roy's Largest Root* 0.087 5.830 p < 0.01     
*: The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level; **: exact; ***: 
approximate 
        
PANEL B        
        
Univariate ANOVA's        
Factor variable: Project Class        
Dependent Variable F        
ECS property rights 4.445 p < 0.05      
ECS decision and control rights 2.283 n.s.      
ECS tasks 7.434 p < 0.01      
ECS duration 6.029 p < 0.01      
ECS separation procedures 1.259 n.s.      
ECS warranties and indemnities 10.941 p < 0.01      
ECS prices, fees and royalties 4.656 p < 0.01      
        
PANEL C        
        
Post hoc comparison of group means       
 I: High-Tech; J: Engineering  I : High-Tech; J: Creative 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Diff.   
(I-J) Std. Error    
Mean Diff.   
(I-J) Std. Error   
ECS property rights 0.210 0.126 n.s.  0.441 0.146 p < 0.01 
ECS decision and control rights 0.162 0.117 n.s.  0.299 0.136 p < 0.1 
ECS tasks -0.192 0.110 n.s.  0.275 0.137 n.s. 
ECS duration -0.276 0.121 p < 0.1  0.152 0.145 n.s. 
ECS separation procedures -0.038 0.123 n.s.  0.173 0.145 n.s. 
ECS warranties and indemnities -0.458 0.127 p < 0.01  0.102 0.148 n.s. 
ECS prices, fees and royalties -0.396 0.131 p < 0.01  -0.157 0.163 n.s. 
 
 I: Creative; J: Engineering 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Diff.  
(I-J) Std. Error   
ECS property rights -0.231 0.127 n.s. 
ECS decision and control rights -0.137 0.123 n.s. 
ECS tasks -0.468 0.126 p < 0.01 
ECS duration -0.428 0.133 p < 0.01 
ECS separation procedures -0.211 0.132 n.s. 
ECS warranties and indemnities -0.560 0.137 p < 0.01 
ECS prices, fees and royalties -0.239 0.149 n.s. 
Test statistic: Tamhane    
Use of alternative tests gives similar results 
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Table 10 – Informal governance: multivariate analysis of variance 
PANEL A        
        
Multivariate Tests        
Factor variable: Project Class        
Multivariate Test Value F       
Pillai's Trace *** 0.073 2.519 p < 0.01     
Wilks' Lambda ** 0.928 2.520 p < 0.01     
Hotelling's Trace *** 0.076 2.521 p < 0.01     
Roy's Largest Root* 0.052 3.486 p < 0.01     
*: The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level; **: exact; ***: 
approximate 
        
PANEL B        
        
Univariate ANOVA's        
Factor variable: Project Class        
Dependent Variable F        
ISS property rights 1.799 n.s.      
ISS decision and control rights 5.893 p < 0.01      
ISS tasks 0.331 n.s.      
ISS duration 1.029 n.s.      
ISS separation procedures 0.451 n.s.      
ISS warranties and indemnities 1.526 n.s.      
ISS prices fees and royalties 0.435 n.s.      
        
PANEL C        
        
Post hoc comparison of group means       
 I:  High-Tech; J:  Engineering  I : High-Tech; J: Creative 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Diff.   
(I-J) Std. Error    
Mean Diff.   
(I-J) Std. Error   
ISS property rights 0.203 0.120 n.s.  0.045 0.141 n.s. 
ISS decision and control rights 0.379 0.116 p < 0.01  0.162 0.136 n.s. 
ISS tasks -0.001 0.115 n.s.  -0.095 0.132 n.s. 
ISS duration 0.090 0.123 n.s.  0.208 0.140 n.s. 
ISS separation procedures 0.098 0.113 n.s.  0.018 0.136 n.s. 
ISS warranties and indemnities -0.078 0.119 n.s.  0.142 0.138 n.s. 
ISS prices fees and royalties -0.043 0.120 n.s.  0.079 0.143 n.s. 
 
 I:  Creative; J:  Engineering 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Diff.     
(I-J) Std. Error   
ISS property rights 0.158 0.121 n.s. 
ISS decision and control rights 0.217 0.118 n.s. 
ISS tasks 0.093 0.117 n.s. 
ISS duration -0.118 0.123 n.s. 
ISS separation procedures 0.080 0.122 n.s. 
ISS warranties and indemnities -0.220 0.122 n.s. 
ISS prices fees and royalties -0.121 0.129 n.s. 
Test statistic: Tamhane    
Use of alternative tests gives similar results   
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Table 11 – Gini coefficients of inequality of property rights assignments: Correlations and descriptive 
statistics 
    1 2 3 4 5 
1 Gini of asset ownership 1     
2 Gini of output ownership 0.351 1    
3 Gini of monetary results 0.340 0.502 1   
4 Gini of decision rights 0.308 0.412 0.499 1  
5 Gini of control rights 0.210 0.488 0.468 0.691 1 
       
 Mean 0.74 0.88 0.78 0.77 0.81 
 Std. Deviation 0.37 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.25 
 Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 
 Maximum 1 1 1 1 1 
  N 361 428 449 517 481 
 
Table 12 - Paired sample tests of difference of means between measures of inequality of property 
rights assignments between project partners 
  Paired Differences       
   
95% C-I of the 
Difference    
Pairs Mean Lower Upper t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Output ownership minus       
 Control rights 0.07 0.04 0.09 5.79 398 0.000 
 
Rights on monetary 
results 0.07 0.05 0.10 5.97 390 0.000 
 Decision rights 0.10 0.08 0.12 8.05 422 0.000 
 Asset ownership 0.15 0.11 0.19 7.65 342 0.000 
Control rights minus       
 
Rights on monetary 
results 0.03 0.00 0.05 1.81 415 0.072 
 Decision rights 0.04 0.02 0.05 3.82 479 0.000 
 Asset ownership 0.06 0.02 0.10 2.75 336 0.006 
Rights on monetary 
results minus       
 Decision rights 0.02 -0.01 0.04 1.13 441 0.260 
 Asset ownership 0.06 0.02 0.10 2.90 336 0.004 
Decision rights minus       
  Asset ownership 0.03 -0.01 0.07 1.52 357 0.129 
Note: Each pair is composed by two Gini indexes of inequality of assignments of the property rights described in the 
‘Pairs’ columns. 
 25
Table 13 – Inequality of property rights 
 
PANEL A: Univariate ANOVAs 
   
Factor variable: Project Class   
Dependent variable F   
Gini of asset ownership 2.036 n.s. 
Gini of output ownership 0.573 n.s. 
Gini of monetary results 3.003 p < 0.1 
Gini of decision rights 3.064 p < 0.05 
Gini of control rights 2.374 p < 0.1 
 
PANEL B: Post hoc comparison of group means 
       
 I: High Tech; J: Engineering  I: High Tech; J: Creative 
Dependent Variable 
Mean 
Diff.  
(I-J) Std. Error    
Mean Diff.  
(I-J) Std. Error   
Gini of asset ownership 0.002 0.050 n.s.  0.105 0.066 n.s. 
Gini of output ownership 0.019 0.029 n.s.  -0.009 0.030 n.s. 
Gini of monetary results -0.003 0.042 n.s.  -0.090 0.043 p < 0.15 
Gini of decision rights -0.053 0.034 n.s.  -0.091 0.036 p < 0.05 
Gini of control rights -0.036 0.036 n.s.  -0.080 0.036 p < 0.1 
Test statistic: Tamhane        
 
 I: Creative; J: Engineering 
Dependent Variable 
Mean 
Diff.  
(I-J) Std. Error   
Gini of asset ownership -0.103 0.059 n.s. 
Gini of output ownership 0.028 0.024 n.s. 
Gini of monetary results 0.087 0.032 p < 0.05 
Gini of decision rights 0.038 0.028 n.s. 
Gini of control rights 0.044 0.026 n.s. 
 
